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Abstract 
Purpose 
Until now, most scholars have used one of four competing theories to explain undeclared work. 
Political economy theories explain undeclared work as resulting from the exclusion of workers 
from formal work and welfare, neo-liberal theories explain such work as a voluntarily chosen 
rational economic decision and neo-institutionalist and post-structuralist theories explain those 
engaging as social actors who disagree with the formal rules or seek to help others out 
respectively. Recognising that each theory focuses upon different employment relationships, 
this paper evaluates the proposition that these different theories are more explanations of 
different types of undeclared work.  
Methodology 
To evaluate this, data is reported collected in 2019 across 28 European countries (the 27 
member states of the European Union and the United Kingdom) in special Eurobarometer 
survey 92.1 involving 27,565 interviews.     
Findings 
Of the 3.6% of citizens participating in undeclared work, 10% engage in undeclared waged 
employment, 42% in undeclared self-employment and 48% in undeclared paid favours. 
Reporting their rationales, 7% state purely political economy exclusion-driven reasons, 19% 
solely neo-liberal rational economic actor reasons, 20% purely social actor reasons and 54% 
mixed motives. A logistic regression analysis finds those engaging in undeclared waged 
employment significantly more likely to state purely exclusion-driven rationales, those 
engaging in undeclared self-employment significantly more likely to state neo-liberal rational 
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economic actor and neo-institutionalist social actor rationales and those engaging in undeclared 
paid favours post-structuralist social actor motives.   
Practical Implications 
This finding suggests that the policy initiatives required to tackle undeclared work will vary 
according to the type of undeclared work addressed. These are outlined.  
Originality/value 
Evidence is provided that a different weighting needs to be given to different theories when 
explaining each type of undeclared work.   
 
Keywords: informal economy; labour markets; self-employment; institutional theory; public 
policy; Europe. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The majority (61.2%) of the world’s employed population have their main employment in the 
undeclared economy, with 39.7% of all employees worldwide in undeclared waged 
employment and 86.1% of all own-account workers operating in the undeclared economy (ILO, 
2018). Indeed, of those working undeclared globally, 36.2% are in waged employment, 2.7% 
are employers with employees, 45% own-account workers and 16% family workers (ILO, 
2018). Despite these contrasting employment relations, most scholarship has conventionally 
explained participation in undeclared work in terms of single universal logics. Political 
economy scholars have explained participation to result from these workers exclusion from 
formal work and welfare (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001), neo-
liberals explain participation as a voluntarily chosen rational economic decision De Soto, 
1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007), neo-institutional scholars view them more as social 
actors who disagree with the rules (Godfrey, 2011; Webb et al., 2009) and post-
structuralist scholars view them as social actors seeking to help others out (Williams and 
Horodnic, 2018).  The starting point of this paper is recognition that each of these theories 
focuses upon different employment relationships, with political economy explanations 
focusing upon undeclared waged employment, neo-liberal and neo-institutionalist explanations 
on undeclared self-employment and post-structuralist explanations on undeclared paid favours 
conducted for close social relations. Based on this recognition, the aim of this paper is to 
evaluate the proposition that these different theories are more explanations of different types 
of undeclared work. This has not before been evaluated. 
 To evaluate this, the next section reviews the competing theories resulting in some 
propositions about how each of these theories might be considered more explanations of 
different types of undeclared work. In the third section, and to evaluate this, the data and 
methodology used is set out, namely a logistic regression analysis of 27,565 face-to-face 
interviews in 28 European countries. The fourth section then reports the results on the validity 
of conceptualising these theories more as explanations of different types of undeclared work, 
followed in the fifth and final section by a discussion of the implications for theory and policy, 
the limitations of this study and future research required to further advance understanding. 
 Throughout this paper, the consensus view among practitioners and academics across 
Europe is used which defines undeclared work as paid activities not declared to the authorities 
for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes but which are legal in all other respects 
(European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2017; Williams, 2019). If other absences exist, then the 
paid activity is not undeclared work. For instance, if the goods and/or services produced or sold 
are illegal (e.g., trafficking drugs, firearms), then these are “criminal” activities, which together 
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with undeclared work constitute the wider “shadow economy” (Williams and Windebank, 
1998).    
 
Participation in undeclared work: theoretical explanations 
 
Until the 1970s, a modernisation thesis dominated scholarship which depicted an immutable 
and natural universal formalisation of economies and the undeclared economy as a remnant of 
pre-modern economies waning with modernisation and economic development (Boeke, 1942; 
Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). However, for some five decades, there has been recognition that 
undeclared work is a persistent and widespread facet of economies across the globe (ILO, 2018; 
OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2019). The result is that other explanations have emerged. Here, 
each is reviewed. 
  
Political economy exclusion-driven explanation 
From the 1970s, scholars writing from a political economy standpoint refuted the dual economy 
depiction in the modernisation thesis of a “traditional” undeclared economy and “modern” 
declared economy and instead conceptualised the undeclared economy as an integral 
component of an emerging neoliberal deregulated open global economy (Castells and Portes, 
1989; Moser, 1977). This view of the undeclared economy as a feature of the emergent 
outsourcing, subcontracting and downsizing practices of deregulated global capitalism has 
subsequently been widely adopted (Aliyev, 2015; Davis, 2006; Fernandez-Kelly, 2006; 
Hammer, 2019; Slavnic, 2010).  
Within this perspective, undeclared work is largely conceptualised as low-paid 
“sweatshop-like” waged employment conducted under poor working conditions and existing 
at the bottom of a hierarchy of types of employment (Portes and Haller, 2004; Meagher, 2010; 
Rakowski, 1994). Such undeclared waged employment takes place not only for employers 
operating unregistered but also registered enterprises (Davis, 2006; Small Business Council, 
2004). Indeed, employers are recognised to adopt ever more innovative but illegal practices, 
including re-employing previously dependent employees as independent contractors in order 
to evade paying tax and social security contributions, and other worker rights such as holiday 
and sick pay (Williams and Horodnic, 2019).   
Workers are predominantly viewed as participating in undeclared work due to their 
exclusion from not only declared work but also adequate social protection which is in demise 
under de-regulated global capitalism (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Portes and Roberts, 2005). 
Undeclared work is therefore a survival tactic pursued as a last resort by those excluded from 
the declared labour market and social protection who have no alternative means of livelihood 
(Chen, 2012; Meagher, 2010; Tokman, 2001).  
 Evaluating this explanation, it is known from a 2013 Eurobarometer survey that only 
14% of undeclared work in Europe is waged employment (Williams, 2014) and that just 24% 
of all undeclared workers cite solely exclusion-driven rationales (Williams et al., 2017). There 
is therefore no need to again test its validity as a universal explanation. What is not known, 
however, is whether this theorisation is a valid explanation for participation in undeclared 
waged employment even if it is not for undeclared work in general. Therefore, the following 
can be evaluated:    
 
Political economy exclusion-driven explanation (H1): those engaged in undeclared 
waged employment are significantly more likely to state purely exclusion-driven 
rationales than those engaged in other types of undeclared work. 
 
Neo-liberal exit-driven rational economic actor explanation 
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Recognising that undeclared work is often conducted on an own-account basis, alternative 
agency-oriented explanations have emerged viewing participation as a matter of choice rather 
than because of a lack of choice (Neuwirth, 2011; Small Business Council, 2004). 
For neo-liberal scholars, participation in undeclared work is a rational economic 
decision pursued when confronted by complex regulatory systems and registration procedures, 
high taxes, a corrupt state system and over-regulation (e.g. De Soto, 1989, 2001; Maloney, 
2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Perry and Maloney, 2007). Therefore, undeclared workers are heralded 
as heroes casting off the constraints of state intervention and voluntarily choosing to operate in 
the undeclared economy (e.g. De Soto, 1989; Sauvy, 1984). They enter the undeclared 
economy to evade the financial costs of formal registration along with the associated time and 
effort required (De Soto 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney 2007). Here, therefore, undeclared 
workers are primarily viewed as own-account workers.  
Again, there is no need to test the validity of this neo-liberal explanation as a universal 
explanation. This has been refuted. For example, a 2013 Eurobarometer survey reveals that 
only 30% of undeclared work is conducted as undeclared self-employment (Williams, 2014) 
and that just 45% of all undeclared work is purely exit-driven (Williams et al., 2017). What is 
not known, however, is whether this theorisation is a valid explanation for participation in 
undeclared self-employment even if not valid for undeclared work in general. Therefore, the 
following can be evaluated:   
 
Neo-liberal exit-driven rational economic actors (H2): those participating in undeclared 
self-employment are significantly more likely to state purely neo-liberal rational 
economic actor exit-driven motives than those engaged in other types of undeclared 
work. 
 
Exit-driven social actor explanations: neo-institutionalist and post-structuralist perspectives  
Another agency-oriented group of scholars view own-account workers exiting the declared 
economy not as rational economic actors but as social actors (Gerxhani, 2004; Godfrey, 2011). 
For neo-institutionalists, institutions are “the rules of the game” prescribing what is socially 
acceptable (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990), with all societies having both formal 
institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) and informal institutions which are the “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). Undeclared work is seen as illegal 
but socially legitimate activity taking place outside of formal institutional prescriptions but 
within the norms of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2011; Horodnic, 2018; Siqueira et al., 2016; 
Webb et al., 2009). When formal institutional failings lead to informal and formal institutions 
not being aligned (Webb et al., 2009), the result is greater participation in undeclared work. 
The greater the non-alignment, the more likely is engagement in undeclared work (Williams, 
2019; Williams et al., 2015). This neo-institutionalist approach has been widely used to explain 
undeclared self-employment.   
Until now, it has not been applied to explaining undeclared paid favours conducted for 
close social relations. Instead, a small tributary of post-structuralist, critical and post-capitalist 
thought has transcended the “thin” portrayal of undeclared workers as rational economic actors 
and adopted “thicker” portrayals recognising the social logics often involved (Zelizer, 2011). 
This views own-account undeclared work as voluntary activity often conducted for closer 
social relations such as kin, neighbours, friends and acquaintances for social and redistributive 
reasons to help others out (Williams and Horodnic, 2018).  
Again, there is no need to test the validity of this social actor explanation as a universal 
explanation. Analysis of a 2013 Eurobarometer survey reveals that 30% of undeclared work is 
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conducted as undeclared self-employment and 56% as undeclared paid favours for close social 
relations (Williams, 2014) and that just 45% of all undeclared work is purely exit-driven 
(Williams et al., 2017), although it does not differentiate between rational economic actor and 
social actor rationales. What is not known, however, is whether these social actor theorisations 
are valid explanations for participation in the different types of undeclared own-account work 
even if not generally valid. Therefore, the following can be evaluated:     
 
Social actor explanations (H3): those participating in own-account work are significantly 
more likely to state purely social actor exit-driven motives than those engaged in engaged 
in other types of undeclared work. 
H3a: those participating in undeclared self-employment are significantly more likely to 
state purely social actor exit-driven motives than those engaged in engaged in other types 
of undeclared work. 
H3b: those participating in undeclared paid favours are significantly more likely to state 
purely social actor exit-driven motives than those engaged in engaged in other types of 
undeclared work. 
 
Beyond universal explanations  
 
Most scholars have viewed one or other of the above as universally valid theories. However, a 
small tributary of thought has contested this. Perry and Maloney (2007: 2), for example, 
focusing upon the political economy and neo-liberal explanations, assert, “These two lenses, 
focusing, respectively, on informality driven by exclusion from state benefits and on voluntary 
exit decisions resulting from private cost-benefit calculations, are complementary rather than 
competing analytical frameworks”.  
 Until now, the evidence-base to support this more integrative theoretical approach has 
pursued several avenues. For example, it has revealed that exclusion-driven explanations are 
more applicable in the global South and exit-driven explanations in the global North (ILO, 
2018; Williams and Lansky, 2014), and that exclusion-driven explanations are more applicable 
to marginalised socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial populations and exit-driven 
explanations to less marginalised populations (Williams and Horodnic, 2015). Evidence has 
also revealed that the undeclared economy is a dual labour market composed of “core” exit-
driven and “peripheral” exclusion-driven workers (Williams and Windebank, 1998) or what 
Fields (1990, 2005) terms an “upper tier” of exit-driven and “lower tier” of exclusion-driven 
workers (Lozano, 1989; Williams and Bezeredi, 2018b; Williams et al., 2017).    
 However, there has been so far no evaluation of whether these different theories are 
more explanations of different types of undeclared work. The aim here is to evaluate whether 
this is the case.   
 
Methodology 
To evaluate this, data is reported from 27,565 interviews conducted in September 2019 for 
Eurobarometer special survey 92.1 in 28 European countries (the 27 European Union member 
states and the UK). The interviews were undertaken in the national language in every country 
with adults aged 15 years and older. A multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology 
was used which ensures representativeness on the variables of gender, age, region and locality 
size in every nation. For the univariate analysis, the sample weighting scheme is used as 
recommended in both the wider literature (Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship 
and Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful descriptive 
results. For the multivariate analysis however, debate exists over whether to use a weighting 
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scheme (Pfeffermann, 1993; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 
1994). Reflecting the majoritarian view, the decision has been taken here not to do so. 
The dependent variables are undeclared waged employment, undeclared self-
employment and undeclared paid favours, identified as follows: 
• Undeclared waged employment – a categorical variable with value 1 for persons who 
answered “yes” to the question Would you describe your undeclared paid activities “as 
undertaken as waged work for an employer”, and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
• Undeclared self-employment – a categorical variable with value 1 for persons who 
answered “yes” to the question Would you describe your undeclared paid activities “as 
undertaken on your own account”, and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
• Undeclared paid favours – a categorical variable with value 1 for persons who 
answered “friends, colleagues, acquaintances, relatives or neighbours” to the question 
“please could you tell me for whom you carried out these undeclared paid activities?”, 
and with recorded value 0 otherwise. 
To understand their reasons for engaging in undeclared work, participants were asked “What 
were the reasons for doing these activities undeclared?” followed by a list of 16 reasons 
(derived from the above three theoretical perspectives) with participants informed that they 
could agree with all that applied to their situation. The explanatory variables derive from 
grouping participants’ responses as follows:  
• Purely political economy exclusion-driven rationales: a dichotomous variable recorded 
value 1 for those stating one or more of the following exclusion-driven rationales (i.e., 
the person acquiring the work insisted on non-declaration; you could not find a regular 
job; it is difficult to live on social welfare benefits; you would lose your social welfare 
benefits if you declared it; you have no other means of income) and no exit-driven 
rationales, and recorded value 0 otherwise. 
• Purely neo-liberal exit-driven rationales: a dichotomous variable recorded value 1 for 
those stating one or more of the following exit-driven rationales (i.e., bureaucracy or red 
tape for a regular economic activity is too complicated; bureaucracy or red tape for 
minor or occasional activities is too complicated; you were able to ask for a higher fee 
for your work; both parties benefited from it; taxes and/or social security contributions 
are too high; it was not clear whether the work needed to be declared) and no exclusion-
driven rationales or the other neo-institutionalist exit=driven rationales, and recorded 
value 0 otherwise. 
• Purely social actor exit-driven rationales: a dichotomous variable recorded value 1 for 
those stating one or more of the following exit-driven rationales (i.e., believe that 
intentionally not declaring small secondary income is perfectly acceptable; this is 
common practice in my region or sector; this is a common practice among friends, 
neighbours or relatives; the state does not do anything for me, so why should I pay taxes) 
and no exclusion-driven or neo-liberal exit-driven rationales, and recorded value 0 
otherwise. 
• “Mixed” rationales: a dichotomous variable recorded value 1 for persons who reported 
both exclusion- and/or exit-driven rationales, and recorded value 0 otherwise. 
Similar to previous studies analysing the 2007 and 2013 Eurobarometer surveys (Williams and 
Horodnic, 2015, 2017, 2020; Williams et al., 2015), the control variables selected cover a range 
of socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables included as standard practice in 
Eurobarometer surveys:  
• Gender: A dummy variable with value 0 for women and 1 for men. 
• Age:  A categorical variable indicating the age of a respondent with value 1 for fifteen 
to twenty-four years, value 2 for twenty-five to thirty-nine years, value 3 for forty to 
fifty-four years, and value 4 for fifty-five years and older. 
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• Marital status: A categorical variable grouping respondent by their marital status with 
value 1 for (re)married, value 2 for single living with a partner, value 3 for single, value 
4 for divorced/separated, value 5 for widow. 
• Adults in household:  A categorical variable for number of adults aged 15+ in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 
2 for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more. 
• Children: A dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for those living in households with no children and value 1 for 
those having children. 
• Employment status: A categorical variable grouping respondents by their employment 
status with value 1 for self-employed, value 2 employed and value 3 for not working 
persons. 
• Difficulties paying bills: A categorical variable for the respondent’s difficulties in 
paying bills with value 1 for having difficulties most of the time, value 2 for 
occasionally, and value 3 for almost never/ never. 
• Urban/rural area:  A categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with 
value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle-sized town, and value 3 for 
large town. 
• European region:  A categorical variable for the region where the respondent lives with 
value 1 for East-Central Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia), value 2 for Western Europe 
(UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria), value 3 for Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal) 
and value 4 for Nordic nations (Denmark, Finland, Sweden). 
To analyse the data, logistic regression analysis is used. This is used for testing hypotheses 
about relationships between a categorical dependent variable and one or more categorical or 
continuous independent variables. The dependent variable in logistic regression is binary.  
Logistic regression predicts the logit of Y to X. Since the logit is the natural logarithm 
(ln) of odds of Y, and the odds are the ratios of probabilities (p) of Y happening to probabilities 
(1 – p) of Y not happening. In analysis, logit command is used to run logistic regression instead 
of logistic command. This is because logit displays the coefficients instead of odds ratios. We 
fit the following model; 
Pr�𝒴𝒴𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽�
1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽� 
The maximum likelihood method is used for estimating the least squares function (Greene, 
2018). The log-likelihood function for logit is   𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 =�𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽�+𝑗𝑗∈𝑆𝑆 �𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�1 − 𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽�𝑗𝑗∉𝑆𝑆  
where S is the set of all observations, j, such that 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ≠ 0,𝑙𝑙(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧1+𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 denotes the optional 
weights. lnL is maximized. 
 
Findings 
 
Of the 3.6% of citizens interviewed in these 28 European countries reporting participation in 
undeclared work in the previous 12 months, 10% engaged in undeclared waged employment, 
42% in undeclared self-employment and 48% in undeclared paid favours (see Table 1). Of 
those explaining their participation solely using exclusion-driven rationales, 35% engaged in 
undeclared waged employment, 30% in undeclared self-employment and 35% in undeclared 
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paid favours. Therefore, those reporting purely exclusion-driven rationales more commonly 
engage in undeclared waged employment. Those reporting solely neo-liberal exit-driven 
rational economic actor motives, meanwhile, are slightly more likely to engage in undeclared 
self-employment, whilst those reporting solely exit-driven social actor rationales are more 
likely to engage in own-account undeclared work, especially paid favours.    
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Analysing participants’ rationales for participating in undeclared work, Table 2 reveals that 7% 
explain their participation purely in terms of political economy exclusion-driven reasons, 19% 
cite solely neo-liberal rational economic actor exit-driven reasons, 20% purely neo-
institutionalist social actor exit-driven reasons and 54% mixed motives. This displays that there 
is no one single universal logic and that all explanations are required to fully explain undeclared 
work.  
Table 2 also displays that each explanation is more relevant to some types of undeclared 
work than others. For example, the exclusion-driven explanation is more applicable to 
explaining undeclared waged employment (with 23% in undeclared waged employment using 
purely exclusion-driven rationales) than it is to explaining own-account undeclared work 
(where just 5% explain their participation using purely exclusion-driven rationales). Similarly, 
the purely social actor explanation is more applicable to explaining own-account forms of 
undeclared work such as undeclared self-employment and undeclared paid favours (with 23% 
and 21% respectively explaining their participation using purely social actor exit-driven 
rationales) than waged undeclared employment (with just 8% of waged workers explaining 
their participation in terms of purely social actor motives). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
These descriptive statistics, therefore, suggest that certain theoretical explanations are more 
relevant when explaining some forms of undeclared work than others. For example, the 
political economy theory seems more commonly applicable to capturing participants’ 
rationales for undeclared waged employment, and the more agency-oriented theorisations more 
commonly applicable for own-account undeclared work.  
Table 2 also displays that undeclared work is not evenly distributed across the 
population. Some population groups are over-represented. Those more likely to participate in 
undeclared work as a whole are men, younger age groups, single people and the 
divorced/separated, multiple adult households, the self-employed, those more frequently 
having difficulties paying the bills, those living in a rural area or village and in Western 
European and Nordic nations. The population groups over-represented for every type of 
undeclared work are generally the same as for undeclared work in general. Nevertheless, there 
are some notable differences. Undeclared waged employment is markedly more likely than 
undeclared work in general to be undertaken by young people aged 15-24 years old, single 
people, living in households with 3 or more adults, who are in declared employment, more 
frequently have difficulties paying the bills, and live in large urban areas and in East-Central 
and Southern Europe. Undeclared self-employment, meanwhile, is more likely than undeclared 
work in general to be undertaken by slightly older people, single person households, the 
formally self-employed, and to be more likely to live in rural areas or a village rather than 
urban areas. Paid favours, moreover, are more likely than undeclared work in general to be 
conducted by men, those who less frequently have difficulties paying the bills, who live in 
small or middle-size urban areas and in Western Europe and the Nordic nations.   
To analyse whether these descriptive findings persist when other variables are 
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introduced and held constant, Table 3 reports a logistic regression analysis. The finding is that 
those engaged in undeclared waged employment are significantly more likely to state purely 
exclusion-driven rationales than those engaged in all types of undeclared work (confirming 
H1) and mixed motives. Those participating in undeclared self-employment are significantly 
more likely to state neo-liberal rational economic actor exit-driven motives (confirming H2) 
and neo-institutionalist social actor exit-driven motives (confirming H3a). Finally, those 
engaged in undeclared paid favours are significantly more likely to state social actor exit-driven 
motives (confirming H3b) and mixed motives.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to who engages in each type of undeclared work, meanwhile, those who engage in 
undeclared waged employment are significantly more likely than those engaged in undeclared 
work in general to be divorced, separated or widowed (perhaps reflecting that undeclared 
waged employment helps evade maintenance payments), live in multiple adult households, less 
likely to be self-employed than not working, and to have financial difficulties from time to 
time, live in large urban areas and in Southern Europe and East-Central Europe. Those in 
undeclared self-employment, meanwhile, are significantly more likely to be (re-)married rather 
than divorced, separated or widowed, not working rather than employed, live in single person 
households, and live in a rural area or village. Those undertaking undeclared paid favours, 
finally, display no significant variations except that they are more likely to live in Western 
Europe and the Nordic nations than in East-Central Europe, and those in Southern Europe are 
less likely than those in East-Central Europe to conduct paid favours.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Analysing the rationales for engaging in each type of undeclared work, those engaged in 
undeclared waged employment are significantly more likely to state purely exclusion-driven 
rationales than those engaged in all types of undeclared work (confirming H1) and mixed 
motives. Those participating in undeclared self-employment are significantly more likely to 
state neo-liberal rational economic actor exit-driven motives (confirming H2) and neo-
institutionalist social actor exit-driven motives (confirming H3a), and those engaged in 
undeclared paid favours significantly more likely to state neo-institutionalist social actor exit-
driven motives (confirming H3b) and mixed motives. 
Theoretically, three advances are therefore made. Firstly, no single theory fully explains 
all participants’ reasons for participation. Therefore, there is a need to integrate them if 
undeclared work is to be fully explained. Secondly, the finding is that undeclared waged 
workers are significantly more likely to state purely exclusion-driven rationales and own-
account workers significantly more likely to state purely agency-oriented exit-driven 
rationales. However, no singular logic fully explains either undeclared waged employment, 
undeclared self-employment or undeclared paid favours. All approaches are required. Third 
and finally, the finding that 54% state mixed motives reveal the need for a continuum of 
explanations for each form of undeclared work to be envisaged ranging from solely exclusion-
driven undeclared workers at one end to solely agency-oriented undeclared workers at the other 
end.  
This recognition that different weightings are required on different theories for each 
type of undeclared work has important policy implications since the policy measures used will 
vary according to the type of undeclared work being addressed. For undeclared waged 
employment, where exclusion-driven explanations are more relevant, firstly, active formal 
labour market policy interventions and greater levels of social protection targeted at vulnerable 
groups is a way forward and secondly, increasing the sanctions and risks of detection for 
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employers. Empirical studies reveal lower participation in undeclared work when there is 
greater expenditure on active labour market policies and social protection to support vulnerable 
groups (Horodnic, 2018; Williams, 2014, Williams and Horodnic, 2020). This study reveals 
that in Europe such initiatives should particularly target those living in large urban areas and 
in Southern Europe and East-Central Europe. There is also evidence that although raising 
sanctions and detection risks has no significant impact on workers participation in the 
undeclared economy (Williams and Horodnic, 2020), employers’ participation is significantly 
impacted by the expected penalties and risk of detection (Williams and Bezeredi, 2018a).  
For undeclared self-employment, however, where neo-liberal and neo-institutionalist 
perspectives prevail, firstly, policy initiatives are required to make it easier and beneficial for 
the self-employed to operate legitimately (for those participating as a rational economic 
decision) and secondly, initiatives to reduce the non-alignment of formal and informal 
institutions by either changing informal institutions (i.e., education and awareness raising) or 
modernising formal institutions (for those doing so as social actors). The former can include 
simplifying compliance (Alstadsæter and Jacob 2013), such as tax authorities more fully 
implementing pre-filled tax returns (Jensen and Wöhlbier 2012) or using call centres to provide 
advice and support on the transition to legitimacy, and regularisation schemes enabling 
employers and workers to move into the declared realm without penalisation (Williams and 
Yalaman, 2021). Meanwhile, to tackle the asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions, on the one hand, changes in norms, values and beliefs can be sought using 
awareness raising campaigns about the benefits of operating on a declared basis (European 
Commission, 2020) and on the other hand, formal institutions can be modernised by enhancing 
procedural and redistributive justice and fairness (Molero and Pujol, 2012; Murphy, 2005). The 
finding of the current study is that all these initiatives could particularly target (re)married 
people, those not officially working, living in single person households, and in a rural areas or 
villages.  
For undeclared paid favours, a laissez-faire approach cannot be adopted since 
enforcement authorities are unable to differentiate between whether undeclared own-account 
work is for financial gain or mutual aid to help others. Instead, there is a need to move this 
endeavour into the declared economy either using schemes to enable this activity to be 
conducted legitimately or changing the rules. The former might include developing Local 
Exchange and Trading Schemes (LETS) or time banks which legitimise such endeavour and 
are an effective substitute for undeclared work (Williams et al., 2001). An example of the latter 
is to allow citizens to undertake own-account activity tax free up to a fixed amount, exemplified 
by the UK where up to £1000 per annum can be earned (see Davidson, 2016). 
Even if this paper has made theoretical and policy advances, there nevertheless exist 
various limitations and pathways for future research. First, these findings are relevant only for 
Europe. Whether they are valid in individual nations and other regions of the world requires 
further research. Second, future research could begin to disaggregate the group of participants 
displaying mixed motives to better understand their position on the continuum of motives. 
Third, and relatedly, qualitative research is required of participants’ rationales. For example, a 
reason for the low level of purely exclusion-driven participants might be because when 
excluded, they also view engagement as a rational economic decision and disagree with the 
formal rules, thus ending up in the “mixed” motives category. This requires fuller exploration.  
 In sum, if this paper stimulates the further integration of the singular logics and a 
movement away from explaining undeclared work in general and towards explaining the 
different types of undeclared work in other global regions and individual countries, then one 
of its intentions will have been achieved. If it also results in government authorities recognising 
the need for variegated policy approaches for each type of undeclared work and adopting an 
11 
 
approach appropriate to its configuration in their country, then its fuller intention will have 
been achieved.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics on explanations for participation: by type of undeclared work  
 N % in 
undeclared 
waged 
employment 
% in 
undeclared 
self-
employment 
% in 
undeclared 
paid favours 
All 997 10 42 48 
Purely exclusion-driven 69 35 30 35 
Purely exit-driven rational 
economic actors 
190 10 44 46 
Purely exit-driven social actors   200 0 44 56 
Mixed rationales 538 10 42 48 
Source: author’s calculations from Eurobarometer special survey 92.1, 2019 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on rationales and characteristics of participants in each type of 
undeclared work 
  Source: author’s calculations from Eurobarometer special survey 92.1, 2019 
  
 All 
citizens  
 
All 
undeclar
ed work 
Undeclared 
waged 
employment 
 
Undeclare
d self-
employmen
t  
Undeclared 
paid favours 
No. respondents 20,821 997 103 415 486 
% of all undeclared work - 100 10 42 48 
Gender (%):      
 Women 53 42 47 43 40 
 Men  47 58 53 57 60 
Age:       
 15-24 8 18 31 14 19 
 25-39 20 30 29 32 29 
 40-54 25 27 23 28 27 
 55+ 47 25 17 26 25 
Marital Status (%):      
 (Re)married 53 38 31 40   37 
 Single living with partner 12 20 18 20 20 
 Single 17 28 35 25 28 
 Divorced/Separated 8 10 9 10 9 
 Widow 9 4 4 4 4 
 Other 1 1 3 1 2 
Adults 15+ years in own household (%):       
 One 24 25 13 28 26 
 Two  51 45 44 46 44 
 Three and More 25 30 43 26 30 
Children (%):      
 No children 76 73 77 71 72 
 Having children 24 27 23 29 28 
Employment status (%):      
 Self employed 8 11 1 15 11 
 Employed 44 44 56 40 44 
 Not working 48 45 43 45 45 
Difficulties paying bills (%):      
 Most of the time 7 16 18 17 15 
 From time to time 23 28 32 27 27 
 Almost never/never 70 56 50 56 58 
Area (%):      
 Rural area or village 33 35 26 38 33 
 Small or middle-sized town 38 38 32 39 40 
 Large town 29 27 42 23 27 
Region (%):      
 East-Central Europe 37 35 43  35    33 
 Western 32 35 21 35 39 
 Southern 18 13  29 12 10 
 Nordic 13 17 7 17 18 
Rationales (%):       
  Purely exclusion  - 7  23 5 5 
  Purely rational economic actor exit - 19 19 20 18 
  Purely social actor exit - 20 8 21 23 
  Mixed motives - 54 50 54 54 
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Table 3. Logistic regressions and reasons for conducting undeclared wage employment, 
undeclared self-employment and undeclared paid favours in Europe, 2019 
 Undeclared waged 
employment 
Undeclared self-
employment 
Undeclared paid 
favours 
Gender (RC: women)    
  Men -0.2276 (0.2357) -0.2490 (0.1596) 0.0416 (0.1724) 
Age (RC: 15-24)    
  25-39 -0.1349 (0.4199) 0.3574 (0.2680) -0.3999 (0.2982) 
  40-54 -0.3374 (0.4625) 0.3981 (0.2918) -0.3053 (0.3163) 
  55+ -0.5821 (0.4788) 0.1771 (0.3136) -0.2558 (0.3407) 
Marital status (RC: (re-)married)    
  Single living with a partner & Single -0.2560 (0.2943) -0.0724 (0.2012) -0.0679 (0.2128) 
  Divorced or separated & widow 0.6001* (0.3245) -0.4214** (0.2120) -0.3412 (0.2282) 
Employment status (RC: not working)    
  Self employed -2.6469** (1.0591) 0.2558 (0.2757) -0.3300 (0.2819) 
  Employed 0.4752 (0.2914) -0.4113** (0.1805) -0.0527(0.1987) 
Adults in household (RC: one)    
  Two 1.2223*** (0.3893) -0.5271** (0.2399) -0.3380 (0.2440) 
  Three and more 1.2392*** (0.4125) -0.6773*** (0.2538) -0.1046 (0.2692) 
Children (RC: children)    
  No children -0.3240 (0.2722) 0.1225 (0.1889) 0.2043 (0.2009) 
Financial difficulties (RC: most of 
time) 
   
  From time to time 0.7206* (0.3934) -0.1967 (0.2520) 0.0012 (0.2574) 
  Almost never/ never 0.4818 (0.4037) -0.0889 (0.2492) 0.1204 (0.2492) 
Area (RC: Rural area or village)    
  Small or middle-sized town -0.0787 (0.2974) -0.3988** (0.1864) -0.0192 (0.1966) 
  Large town 0.7317** (0.2980) -0.7839*** (0.2032) -0.0398 (0.2128) 
Region (RC: East-Central Europe)    
  Western -0.7071** (0.3082) 0.1891 (0.1895) 0.7410*** (0.1999) 
  Southern 0.7975** (0.3253) -0.2291 (0.2531) -0.4751* (0.2507) 
  Nordic -0.6190 (0.4418) 0.1266 (0.2441) 0.7467*** (0.2616) 
Rationale (RC: all undeclared work)    
  Solely exclusion 1.7043*** (0.6377) 0.0585 (0.4842) -0.0319 (0.4331) 
  Solely rational economic actor exit 0.4127 (0.5954) 0.8232** (0.4182) 0.3584 (0.3732) 
  Solely social actor exit -0.6492 (0.6645) 1.3270*** (0.4325) 1.5202*** (0.3920) 
  Mixed motives 0.2489 (0.5729) 1.1388*** (0.4031) 0.9784*** (0.3566) 
Constant -3.4975*** (0.8797) 0.3544 (0.6134) 0.1416 (0.5966) 
Observations 764 764 764 
Pseudo R2 0.1914 0.0763 0.0811 
Log pseudolikelihood -247.2659 -484.6893 -453.7558 
χ2 87.47 66.91 70.98 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
 Source: author’s calculations from Eurobarometer special survey 92.1, 2019 
 
